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ABSTRACT
We develop a life-cycle model to study the eects of house price changes on household
consumption and welfare. The model explicitly incorporates the dual feature of housing
as both a consumption good and an investment asset and allows for costly adjustments
in housing and mortgage positions. Our analysis indicates that although house price
changes have small aggregate eects, their consumption and welfare consequences on
individual households vary signicantly. In particular, the non-housing consumption of
young and old homeowners is much more sensitive to house price changes than that of
middle-aged homeowners. More importantly, while house price appreciation increases
the net worth and consumption of all homeowners, it only improves the welfare of middle-
aged and old homeowners. Young homeowners and renters are worse o due to higher
life-cycle housing consumption costs.
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The economics of housing is a subject of increasing interest to economists as well as policy
makers. For a typical household in the U.S., housing is not only the single most important
consumption good but also the dominant component of wealth. Recent research has focused on
the link between house price changes and consumption allocations. This literature, however,
has been mostly empirical and cannot address the welfare consequences of house price changes
for individual households.1
When markets are complete, households can fully insure against their intertemporal con-
sumption and income risks. House price changes will not aect their consumption and welfare.
In reality, however, lacking proper nancial products to generate full risk-sharing, households
are exposed to house price uncertainties. Owning a home can alleviate the problem by purchas-
ing future housing services at today's price. The hedging, however, is imperfect. Institutional
and borrowing constraints frequently prevent young households with low levels of cash in hand
from purchasing a house that matches their lifetime consumption need. Senior homeowners,
in the meantime, are often forced to hold an equity position in their houses that lasts longer
than their expected length of occupancy. This mismatch between life-cycle housing consump-
tion need and housing investment position is worsened by the presence of lumpy housing
adjustment costs.
In this paper, we investigate the eects of house price changes on household consumption
and welfare both at the aggregate level and over the life cycle. We show that although house
price changes have limited aggregate eects, the consumption and welfare consequences vary
substantially at the individual household level, and depend crucially on a household's age
and housing position. Specically, the non-housing consumption of a young or old home-
owner is more sensitive to house price changes than that of a middle-aged homeowner. More
importantly, although house price appreciation increases the net worth and consumption of
all homeowners, it only improves the welfare of middle-aged and old homeowners. Young
homeowners and renters are worse o.
1See Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2003), Benjamin, Chinloy, and Jud (2004), and Campbell and Cocco
(2004). Bajari, Benkard, and Krainer (2004) investigate aggregate welfare implications of house price changes
in a complete market setting with perfect information.
2These results stem from two key features of the model: the households' inability to insure
against their lifetime income risks, and their inability to separate the dual role of housing as
both a consumption good and an investment asset. A young homeowner is often liquidity-
constrained because of his steep income prole and lack of access to credit. He is therefore
more likely to take advantage of the relaxed collateral borrowing constraint aorded by house
price appreciation and increase his non-housing consumption. An old homeowner has a short
expected life horizon. Hence, he is more likely to capture the house wealth gains and increase
his non-housing consumption accordingly. By contrast, a middle-aged homeowner has accu-
mulated enough liquid savings to overcome the liquidity constraint and faces a relatively long
expected life horizon. His consumption is thus least responsive to changes in house prices.
From the perspective of household welfare, house price appreciation does not lead to wel-
fare improvement for all households. Young homeowners expect to upgrade their housing
services as their income increases and their families expand. A positive house price shock,
therefore, incurs net welfare losses for them, since the rise in the value of their existing homes
is not large enough to compensate them for the rise in their lifetime housing costs. House
price appreciation also lowers a renter's lifetime welfare, since he suers from higher costs
in acquiring housing services and yet does not receive any housing wealth gains. Only old
homeowners receive net welfare gains.
Our paper extends the life-cycle consumption and savings literature that consists of, among
many others, Zeldes (1989), Deaton (1991), and Carroll (1997), by explicitly introducing
housing. The modeling strategy follows most closely that of Campbell and Cocco (2003),
Cocco (2005), Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002), and Yao and Zhang (2005). While
Campbell and Cocco (2003) examine a household's mortgage choice between a xed rate loan
and an adjustable rate loan, Cocco (2005) and Yao and Zhang (2005) study the eects of
housing positions and house price risk on the portfolio allocation of liquid assets between
stocks and bonds. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002) investigate the role of durable
goods in households' consumption and savings decisions in steady state.
Our paper also complements the recent empirical work devoted to the study of the eects
of house price changes on consumption changes by explicitly modeling their theoretical rela-
tionships at both the aggregate and household levels in a life-cycle economy. While conrming
3the positive eects of housing wealth gains on aggregate consumption found in the literature,
we demonstrate that these positive net worth and consumption gains vary substantially across
households and have large heterogeneous welfare consequences.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model economy.
Section 3 characterizes households' consumption, housing, and mortgage decisions. Section 4
analyzes the eects of a permanent house price shock on household consumption and welfare
and contrasts the results with those derived from liquid wealth gains. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model Economy
2.1. Preferences and Endowments
We consider an economy where a household lives at most for the length of time T (T > 0).





j; 0  t  T; (1)
where j is the probability that the household is alive at time j conditional on being alive at
time j   1, j = 0;:::;T. We set 0 = 1, T = 0, and 0 < j < 1 for all 0 < j < T.
The household derives utility from consuming a numeraire good Ct and housing services
Ht, as well as from bequeathing wealth Qt. The within-period utility takes the following




















where Nt denotes the exogenously given eective family size, which captures the economies
of scale in household consumption as argued in Lazear and Michael (1980). We denote the
bequest function as B(Qt).
2Other related recent papers include Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Gervais (2002), Ortalo-Magne and Rady
(2003), Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2004), Davis and Heathcote (2003), Hurst and Staord (2004),
and Sinai and Souleles (2005).
4In each period, the household receives income Yt. Prior to the retirement age, which is set










is the permanent labor income at time t. P Y
t has a deterministic component f(t;Zt), which
is a function of age and household characteristics Zt. t represents the shock to permanent
labor income. "t is the transitory shock to Yt. We assume that fln"t;lntg are independently
and identically normally distributed with mean f 0:52
"; 0:52
g, and variance f2
";2
g, re-
spectively. Thus, lnP Y
t follows a random walk with a deterministic drift f(t;Zt).
After retirement, the household receives an income which constitutes a constant fraction
 (0 <  < 1) of its preretirement permanent labor income,
Yt = P
Y
J ; for t = J;:::;T: (5)
2.2. Housing and Mortgage Contracts
A household can acquire housing services through either renting or owning. A renter has a
house tenure Do
t = 0, and a homeowner has a house tenure Do
t = 1. To rent, the household
pays a fraction  (0 <  < 1) of the market value of the rental house. To become a homeowner,
the household pays a portion  (0 <  < 1) of the house value as closing costs to secure the
title and mortgage. The house price appreciation rate ~ rH
t follows an i.i.d. normal process with
mean H and variance 2
H. The shock to house prices is thus permanent and exogenous.3
3Flavin and Yamashita (2002), Campbell and Cocco (2003), and Yao and Zhang (2005) also assume that
house price shocks are i.i.d. and permanent. Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2003) explore home price dynamics
using data between 1982 and 2003. They nd that home buyers' expectations are substantially aected by
recent experience. Even after a long boom, home buyers typically have expectations that prices over the next
10 years will show double-digit annual price growth.
5A household can nance home purchases with a mortgage. We assume that a mortgage
loan initiated at time t matures at T.4 The mortgage balance denoted by Mt needs to satisfy
the following collateral constraint,
0  Mt  (1   )P
H
t Ht; (6)
where 0    1.5 The borrowing rate r is time-invariant and the same as lending rate. A
homeowner is required to spend a fraction   (0     1) of the house value on repair and
maintenance in order to keep the house quality constant.
At the beginning of each period, the household receives a moving shock, Dm
t , that takes a
value of 1 if the household has to move for reasons that are not modeled here, and 0 otherwise.
The moving shock does not aect a renter's housing choice since moving does not incur any
cost for him. When a homeowner receives a moving shock (Dm
t = 1), he is forced to sell
his house.6 A homeowner who does not have to move for exogenous reasons can choose to
liquidate his house voluntarily. The selling decision, Ds
t, is 1 if the homeowner sells and 0
otherwise. Selling a house incurs a transaction cost that is a fraction  (0    1) of the
market value of the existing house. Additionally, the full mortgage balance becomes due upon
the sale of the home. Following a home sale, a homeowner faces the same decisions as a renter
coming into period t.
If the homeowner does not have to move for exogenous reasons and chooses to stay in the
house, he has the option to convert some home equity to liquid wealth through a \cash-out"
mortgage renancing. Dr
t denotes the renancing decision by the homeowner that takes a
value of 1 if the homeowner renances his mortgage, and 0 otherwise. Renancing requires
a cost that is a fraction  (0    1) of the house value. If the household decides not
4This specication of mortgage loan term follows Campbell and Cocco (2003). It eliminates time-to-
maturity as a separable state variable and considerably simplies the problem.
5By applying collateral constraints to both newly initiated mortgages and ongoing loans, we eectively rule
out default. Default on mortgages is relatively rare in reality. According to the Mortgage Bankers Association,
the seasonally adjusted three-month default rate for a prime xed-rate mortgage loans is around 2 percent.
6We assume that house prices in the old and new locations are the same. In practice, however, house prices
can dier across locations as in Sinai and Souleles (2005).
6to renance, it needs to pay down its mortgage balance according to either the xed-rate
mortgage amortization schedule set at the mortgage initiation,7
Mt = Mt 1(1 + r)  
Mt 1
PT
j=t(1 + r)t j 1 =
1   (1 + r)t T
1   (1 + r)t T 1Mt 1; (7)
or the collateral borrowing constraint (equation 6). We use lt =
Mt 1(1+r)
PH
t Ht 1 to denote the
household's beginning-of-the-period mortgage loan-to-value ratio, and lt = Mt
PH
t Ht to denote
the mortgage loan-to-value ratio upon mortgage initiation, mortgage payment, or renancing.
2.3. Liquid Assets
In addition to holding home equity, a household can save in liquid assets which earn the same
constant riskfree rate r as the borrowing rate. As a result, all mortgage renances in our
model are for consumption purposes only. We denote the liquid savings as St and assume that
households cannot borrow non-collateralized debt, i.e.,
St  0; for t = 0;:::;T: (8)
2.4. Wealth Accumulation and Budget Constraints
We denote the household's spendable resources or \wealth" upon home sale by Qt.8 It follows
that for a renter (Do
t 1 = 0);
St 1(1 + r) + P
Y
t 1 expff(t;Zt)gt"t = Qt; (9)
and for a homeowner (Do
t 1 = 1);
St 1(1 + r) + P
Y
t 1 expff(t;Zt)gt"t + P
H
t 1Ht 1(1 + ~ r
H
t )(1   )   Mt 1(1 + r) = Qt: (10)
The intertemporal budget constraint, therefore, can be written as follows:
7Under an equal lending and borrowing rate, when renancing is costly, a household always wishes to carry
the maximum mortgage balance.
8Under this denition, conditional on selling his house, a homeowner's problem is identical to that of the
renter and depends only on his age t, permanent income PY
t , and liquidated wealth Qt.
7(1) For a renter or a homeowner who decides to sell his house, if he chooses to rent in the
current period (Do
t 1 = Do
t = 0, or Do
t 1 = Ds
t = 1 and Do
t = 0):
Qt = Ct + St + P
H
t Ht: (11)
(2) For a renter or a homeowner who decides to sell his house, if he chooses to buy a home
in the current period (Do
t 1 = 0 and Do




Qt = Ct + St + (1   lt +   + )P
H
t Ht: (12)
(3) For a homeowner who decides to stay in the existing house without renancing his
mortgage in the current period (Do
t 1 = Do
t = 1 and Ds
t = Dr
t = 0),
Qt = Ct + St + (1   lt +     )P
H
t Ht 1: (13)
(4) For a homeowner who decides to stay in the existing house and renance his mortgage
in the current period (Do
t 1 = Do
t = Dr
t = 1 and Ds
t = 0),
Qt = Ct + St + (1   lt +   +    )P
H
t Ht 1: (14)
2.5. The Optimization Problem
We assume that upon death, a household distributes its spendable resources Qt among \L"
beneciaries to nance their numeraire good consumption and housing services through renting
for one period. Parameter \L" thus controls the strength of bequest motives. Under Cobb-
Douglas utility, this assumption results in the beneciary's expenditure on numeraire good
and housing service consumption at a xed proportion (1 !










8The household solves the following optimization problem at time t = 0, given its house
tenure status (Do
 1), after-labor income wealth (Q0), permanent labor income (P Y
0 ), house
price (P H












F(t) U(Ct;Ht;Nt) + [F(t   1)   F(t)]B(Qt)

; (16)
subject to the mortgage collateral borrowing constraint (equation 6), the mortgage amorti-
zation schedule (equation 7), the borrowing constraint on liquid asset (equation 8), wealth
processes (equation 9 and 10), and the intertemporal budget constraints (equations 11 to 14).
 is the time discount factor.
3. Model Calibration
In this section, we rst calibrate the model parameters according to the U.S. economy. We
then discuss the optimal decision rules for renters and homeowners, followed by the simulated
life-cycle proles of household consumption and saving.
3.1. Model Parameterization
The decision frequency is annual. A household enters the economy at age 20 (t = 0), and
lives to a maximum of age 80 (T = 60). The mandatory retirement age is 65 (J = 45). The
conditional survival rates are taken from the 1998 life tables of the U.S. National Center for
Health Statistics (Anderson 2001). We use the 1995-2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
to calibrate the eective household size at each age (Nt). Specically, we rst calculate the
average eective household size by the age of household head using the equivalence scale from
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Federal Register 2001). We then obtain
a life-cycle prole of eective family size, using the synthetic cohort technique as described
in Appendix B. Moving probabilities are calibrated to the average migration rates for non-
housing related reasons between March 2001 and March 2002 in the Current Population Survey
(CPS), as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau (2004).
9For preferences, we set the relative risk aversion 
 at 2. The housing preference parameter !
is set at 0:20, the average share of household housing expenditures found in the 2001 Consumer
Expenditure Survey. We use the parameters for income process for a high school graduate as
reported in Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005).9 In particular, we choose values of 0:1 for
the standard deviation of the permanent shock  and 0:27 for the standard deviation of the
transitory shock " prior to retirement. Income replacement ratio at retirement is set at 0.68.
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) report similar estimates for labor income processes.
The riskfree rate r is set at 0:03, approximately the average annualized post-WWII real
return available on T-bills. For parameters that capture institutional features of the housing
market, we set the annual rental cost  at 6 percent of the current house value. The annual
maintenance and depreciation cost   is set at 1:5 percent of the house value, while the selling
cost of a house  is 6 percent of the market value of the house, the conventional fee charged
by real estate agents. The mortgage collateral constraint is set at 80 percent.10 Our housing
purchase cost  is 1.0 percent of house value.11 The renancing cost  is set at a relatively
low 0:5 percent of the house value to implicitly allow for home equity access through home
equity loans or home equity lines of credit in addition to mortgage renances.
We assume that the housing appreciation rate ~ rH
t is serially uncorrelated and has a mean
of zero, which fell within the empirical range estimated by Goetzmann and Spiegel (2000).12
The housing return volatility H is set at 0:115, similar to estimates in Campbell and Cocco
(2003) and Flavin and Yamashite (2002). We further assume that there is no correlation
between housing returns and shocks to labor income in order to isolate the eects of house
price changes.
9The measurement of labor income used here is broadly dened to include unemployment compensation,
welfare, and transfers.
10Using the 1995 American Housing Survey, Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2004) calculate that the
down payment fraction for rst time home purchases is 0.1979 while the fraction for households that previously
owned a home is 0.2462.
11Benett, Peach, and Peristiani (2001) report that an industry standard for the transaction cost for a new
mortgage, excluding any up front points paid to the lender, is between 1 percent and 1:5 percent of the
mortgage amount, or between 0:8 percent and 1:2 percent of the house value, assuming a 80 percent mortgage
loan-to-value ratio.
12Based on 80 quarters of housing index data between March 1980 and March 1999, Goetzmann and Spiegel
(2000) estimate that the real housing returns for the 12 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) vary
from -1.0 percent to 3.46 percent.
10Finally, we choose the discount rate , and the bequest strength parameter L to match
the average wealth-labor income ratios and home ownership rates over the representative
household's life cycle as observed in the U.S. economy. Table 1 summarizes our model param-
eterization. Details on obtaining a numerical solution are provided in Appendix A. To gain
further insights of the model, we now turn to households' optimal decision rules, followed by
simulated life-cycle consumption and saving proles.
3.2. Optimal Housing and Consumption Decision Rules
3.2.1. A Renter's Optimal Decisions
A household entering the current period as a renter is described by its age (t) and wealth-
permanent labor income ratio (
Qt
PY
t ). Figure 1 presents the renter's optimal house tenure choice.
The solid line represents the wealth-labor income ratio at which the household is indierent
between renting and owning. The household buys a home when its wealth-labor income ratio
is above this line, and continues to rent otherwise. Under our parameterization, on average,
renting costs more per period than owning the same house, i.e.  > r +  . However, due
to house purchasing and selling costs, a household prefers to own a house that matches its
life-cycle income and wealth proles so that the expected tenure in the house is suciently
long. A household with a large amount of wealth on hand can aord the down payment for a
house of desired value and therefore benets more from home ownership.
The wealth-income ratio that triggers home ownership initially decreases with the house-
hold's age. This result is driven by the household's life-cycle income and mobility proles.
Since a young household faces high income growth rates, its desired house is large relative
to its current income. A higher wealth-labor income ratio is needed to satisfy house down
payment requirement to trigger home ownership. Additionally, young households have higher
exogenous mobility rates which also raise the cost of owning. As the household approaches
the terminal period, the threshold wealth-income ratio for home ownership moves up sharply
re
ecting the increasing importance of bequest motive, which is dened as a function of the
bequeathed wealth net of house liquidation cost.
11A renter's consumption and savings functions are similar to those identied in the precau-
tionary savings literature with liquidity constraints (gures 2 and 3). At low wealth levels,
a renter continues to rent and spends all his wealth on numeraire goods and rent payments.
At slightly higher wealth levels, a renter saves a fraction of the wealth in liquid assets for in-
tertemporal consumption smoothing and housing down payment. Note upon making a down
payment toward purchasing a home, the household's liquid savings drop substantially.
3.2.2. A Homeowner's Optimal Decisions












Figure 4 plots a homeowner's endogenous house liquidation and mortgage renancing decisions
as a function of the household's beginning-of-the-period mortgage loan-to-value ratio and
house value-income ratio, while holding his wealth-income ratio constant.13 There are four
regions of (in)actions: (1) the non-admissible region (N.A.) { the homeowner's mortgage loan-
to-value ratio and house value-income ratio cannot take combinations in this region; (2) the
stay region (STAY) { the homeowner stays in his existing house without mortgage renancing;
(3) the stay and renance region (REFI) { the homeowner stays in his house and renances
his mortgage; and (4) the sell region (SELL) { the homeowner sells his house.14
Since a homeowner cannot take on unsecured debt, the value of his home equity cannot
exceed his total wealth. The boundary of the non-admissible region is dened by (1   lt  
)P H
t Ht 1 = Qt. The homeowner stays in the house when his house value-labor income ratio
is not too far from the optimal level he would have chosen as a renter. If he stays in the
house, the homeowner can convert some home equity into liquid form through renancing.
This occurs when the homeowner's home equity is a large fraction of his total wealth, i.e.,
when his mortgage loan-to-value ratio is low or when his house value-wealth ratio is high.
For a homeowner who stays in his house, the composition of his wealth aects his non-
housing consumption. More precisely, for a given house value-income ratio, as his leverage
ratio decreases, the homeowner's liquid savings drop (gure 6), which in turn reduces his
13A homeowner that received an exogenous positive moving shock (Dm
t = 1) has to sell the house and his
subsequent consumption and housing decisions are identical to those of a renter.
14For gures 4, 5, and 6, we hold the household age at 50 and the wealth-income ratio at 2.0.
12non-housing consumption (gure 5). When the level of liquid assets becomes too low, the
homeowner renances his mortgage to gain access to illiquid home equity. The additional
\cash" leads to immediate increases in both non-housing consumption and liquid savings.
3.3. Simulated Life-cycle Housing and Consumption Choices
We now examine a household's average life-cycle consumption and wealth accumulation through
simulation. To do so, we rst simulate permanent and transitory labor incomes, house prices,
and moving shocks according to their respective governing stochastic processes. Then, we
update state variables each period according to the optimal decision rules. For all simulated
paths, households start at age 20 without housing or liquid wealth. We generate the time-
series proles of the optimal decisions by taking the average of 2 million simulations from
t = 0 (age 20) to t = 60 (age 80).
The life-cycle proles generated in our calibrated economy (gure 7) are similar to those
found in the data (gure 8).15 Specically, home ownership rate is hump-shaped over age (g-
ure 7a), while mortgage leverage decreases steadily with age (gure 7b).16 Simulated housing
consumption demonstrates a hump shape over the life cycle, matching that obtained in the
data (gure 7c). As in the consumption literature with liquidity constraint and precautionary
savings motives, non-housing consumption exhibits a hump shape (gure not shown). Due
to signicant selling costs, the housing consumption does not drop as quickly as non-housing
consumption after peaking in the household's early 50s.
The proportion of net worth tied up in home equity exhibits a U-shaped pattern over the
life cycle, consistent with empirical evidence in gure 7d, as well as in Flavin and Yamashita
(2002). Intuitively, when the household is young, most of its wealth is committed to its house.
As the household ages, liquid assets gradually surpass home equity as a primary vehicle
of saving. After retirement, the household draws down its liquid assets rst to supplement
15Appendix B provides details on the empirical estimations of the life-cycle proles of home ownership rate,
mortgage leverage ratio, house value, and home equity-net worth ratio using a pseudo-panel constructed from
the 1995-2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.
16Compared to the data, the home ownership rate in our simulated economy increases more rapidly among
young households. In addition, the average mortgage loan-to-value ratio generated by our model decreases more
slowly prior to retirement than that in the data. These dierences arise mainly due to the long amortization
schedule assumed for the mortgage contract in the model, which substantially reduces the mortgage payments
for young mortgage borrowers and makes housing more aordable.
13retirement income in order to defer mortgage renancing and house selling charges. Eventually,
as a last resort, the household accesses housing wealth through mortgage renancing or home
sales to nance its retirement consumption.
The renancing rate (gure not shown) demonstrates a bimodal pattern with young and
old homeowners more likely to renance than middled-aged homeowners. With equal lending
and borrowing rates, a household renances for consumption-smoothing purposes only. A
young household does not have signicant nancial wealth and is more likely to be liquidity-
constrained. Therefore, it benets most from mortgage renancing after a period of strong
house appreciation. When an old homeowner has depleted his liquid savings, \cash-out"
mortgage renancing helps him further defer house selling costs and avoid the more expensive
alternative means of acquiring housing services through renting.17 By the terminal period,
nearly 20 percent of all households in our simulation have sold their houses and switched back
to renting, a number comparable to that reported by Venti and Wise (2000). The exit from
home ownership is usually triggered by exogenous moving events.
Summary aggregate statistics for the benchmark model economy and their data coun-
terparts are reported in Table 2. Our model generates statistics that replicate the targeted
numbers reasonably well. However, the average net worth-labor income ratios are somewhat
lower in the model than in the data for homeowners and renters respectively, while the home
ownership rate is slightly higher.
4. Results
We now investigate the eects of house price changes on household consumption and welfare
at both the aggregate levels and across individual households at dierent stage of the life cycle,
using our benchmark economy. Then we explore the role of housing and mortgage adjustment
costs. Lastly, we compare the eects of housing wealth gains to those from liquid asset.
17Hurst and Staord (2004) nd evidence that households use home equity to smooth consumption. Recent
studies also suggest that seniors take money out of their homes through reduced expenditures on routine
maintenance, alterations, and repairs (see Gyourko and Tracy 2003, and Davido 2004) instead of renances
or reverse mortgages (Feinstein and McFadden 1989).
14To obtain the average eects of a permanent house price change on a household's con-
sumption and welfare, for each age t, we separate households in our simulated economy into
two groups: those who experienced a permanent house price appreciation and those who ex-
perienced a permanent house price depreciation. The two groups so constructed only dier in
the house price shocks they receive at age t. Eectively, one can view the exercise as compar-
ing the behavior of ex ante identical households in two dierent economic environments, one
receiving a positive house price shock and the other receiving a negative house price shock.18
We focus on three economic variables: the average home ownership rate, the Marginal
Propensity to Consume (MPC) out of housing wealth, and the household welfare. The MPC
is calculated as the ratio of the mean consumption dierence between households in the two
dierent economic environments to the mean housing wealth dierence.
Our welfare metric is dened as the necessary compensation to the households experiencing
negative housing shocks that can bring their lifetime utility to the mean utility of households
experiencing a positive house price shock. The compensation is in the form of a proportional
increase in durable and non-durable consumptions for the remaining life span, as well as
the bequeathed wealth upon death. Specically, we rst calculate by age the sum of value




























; t = 0;:::;T; and j = up; dn; (17)
where j is the index for the state of housing returns and i is the index for the heterogenous
agents in state j. K
j
t is the total number of agents at time t that fall in the j-th state of














18Recall that in each period, the stochastic shocks to moving, housing returns, permanent and temporary
components of labor incomes are approximated by a sixteen-state Markov chain. The shocks are assumed to
be independent of each other and uncorrelated over time. Therefore, with a large number of simulations, the
ex ante distribution of the state variables { home ownership status, wealth-income ratio, house value-income
ratio, and mortgage loan-to-value ratios { should be identical for households experiencing either positive or
negative house price shocks ex post.
19Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) adopt a similar measure of welfare in an innite horizon economy.
154.1. The Eects of House Price Appreciation on Consumption and
Welfare
Table 3 reports the eects of house price changes on aggregate consumption and welfare.20
A permanent two standard-deviation change in house prices has a rather limited eect on
aggregate home ownership rate and total household welfare, with the former increasing 0.44
percent and the latter decreasing 0.98 percent. The aggregate MPC, at 4.06 percent, is within
the range of empirical estimates,21 albeit at the lower end.
The eects of permanent house price changes on individual households vary signicantly
as depicted in gure 9. Here we examine, by age, changes in housing positions along both
the extensive margin and the intensive margin, and changes in non-housing consumption, net
worth, and total welfare.
Figure 9a presents home ownership transitions upon the realization of the house price
shock for homeowners at the beginning of the period, and gure 9b presents housing positions
conditional on a household being a homeowner both before (\in") and after (\out") housing
adjustments for the current period. In our simulation, young homeowners are more likely to
exit home ownership after a negative house price shock than after a positive price shock. This
is because if the household experiencing a negative house price shock is forced to move and
sell the house for exogenous reasons, its wealth-income ratio is more likely to fall below the
triggering level for home ownership. By contrast, for middle-aged homeowners, the proportion
of households exiting home ownerships is not sensitive to house price changes. These house-
holds have accumulated signicant wealth and can sustain home ownership despite changes in
house prices. The home ownership exit patterns for senior homeowners are very similar across
too groups, and are largely caused by the exogenous mobility shocks.
Young homeowners who choose to stay as homeowners tend to upgrade to bigger houses
after a negative house price shock and do not actively adjust their house sizes after a positive
house price shock. Middle-aged and old homeowners, on the other hand, tend to downgrade
to smaller houses after a positive house price shock and do not change housing sizes after
20The statistics reported take into account the survival probability of households at dierent ages.
21Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2003) nd that an additional dollar of house wealth increases household
consumption by 3 to 15 cents. Benjamin, Chinloy, and Judd (2004) nd the eect of housing wealth on
household consumption of similar magnitude { 8 cents out of a dollar.
16a negative house price shock. This asymmetry is primarily driven by the hump-shaped life-
cycle housing consumption prole. A house price appreciation substitutes for active house
up-sizing for young homeowners and accelerates down-sizing for old homeowners. A house
price depreciation, in comparison, substitutes for active house downsizing for old homeowners
and accelerates up-sizing for young homeowners.
Figures 9c and 9d depict the impact of house price shocks on homeowners' non-housing
consumption and net worth.22 The hump-shaped housing consumption prole over the life-
cycle leads to a hump-shaped distribution of housing wealth gains. Not surprisingly, across
all ages, those who experienced a permanent house price appreciation spend more on non-
housing consumption than those who experienced a permanent house price depreciation. What
is interesting, however, is that the non-housing consumption of young and old homeowners is
more sensitive to house price changes than that of the middle-aged (gure 9e). As discussed
earlier, young households are more likely to be liquidity-constrained. Housing appreciation,
by increasing the collateral value, helps relax young homeowners' borrowing constraints and
increase their non-housing consumption. Old homeowners have a short life horizon. They
thus are more likely to capture the gains and increase their non-housing consumption and
bequest accordingly. By contrast, middle-aged homeowners have accumulated enough liquid
savings to overcome liquidity constraints. They also face a relatively long expected life span.
Their consumption is, therefore, least responsive to house price changes.
Figure 9f presents the welfare consequences of house price changes for renters, homeowners,
and households as a whole. Observe that house price appreciation unambiguously lowers
renters' welfare since they have to bear the higher cost of acquiring lifetime housing services
without receiving any housing wealth gains. According to our calculation, a positive house
price shock of 11.5 percent leads to a welfare loss of around 4.5 percent, relative to the case
of a negative house price shock of the same magnitude.
Surprisingly, although house price appreciation raises the non-housing consumption and
networth positions for all homeowners (gures 9c and 9d), these consumption increases do
not translate into welfare gains for all homeowners. In particular, a positive housing shock
22Under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas utility function, a renter responds to house price shocks by ad-
justing the level of housing service 
ows (Ht) while keeping housing expenditure (P H
t Ht) unchanged.
17incurs about a 2 percent utility loss for young homeowners in their late 20s to mid 30s. This
result arises because young homeowners face a long horizon of future housing consumption,
and on average, are expecting to move up in the housing ladder. Thus, their investment
gains from existing housing positions are not sucient to compensate them for the increase in
their lifetime housing consumption costs. In our simulation, the break-even age for welfare is
reached around age 50. Only households beyond the age of 65 receive a welfare gain exceeding
2 percent.
In summary, our analysis suggests although house price 
uctuations have small aggregate
eects, as argued in Sinai and Souleles (2005) and Bajari, Benkard, and Krainer (2004), they
can create large distributional eects and these eects depend crucially on households' age
and housing positions.
4.2. The Eects of Adjustment Costs
Housing market features large adjustment costs. To explore the quantitative impact of this
adjustment cost, we now set the costs of house purchasing and selling, as well as mortgage
renancing, to zero. The new economy thus resembles that of Fernandez-Villaerde and Krueger
(2002). The results are presented in gure 10.
In the absence of adjustment costs, the aggregate eects of a permanent house price appre-
ciation remain small, as reported in table 3. At 0.53 percent, the increase in the average home
ownership rate relative to the case of a negative house price appreciation is slightly higher than
the benchmark case. Interestingly, the total welfare change is now positive. In our economy,
house price appreciation aects a homeowner's welfare through three channels simultaneously.
First it increases the household net worth position. Second it raises future housing consump-
tion costs by (1) increasing the unit price of housing service 
ows; (2) increasing house selling
costs and mortgage renancing charges; and (3) increasing house maintenance costs. While
a homeowner's wealth gains exactly oset the high unit costs of housing service 
ows for the
existing house, higher adjustment and maintenance costs represent a deadweight loss in the
economy. Yet, facing a new price vector, a household can reallocate its housing and non-
housing expenditures. When housing adjustment costs are absent, the household can more
18easily re-optimize over their consumption bundle, which leads to positive aggregate welfare
eects.
The individual eects are still large and there are noticeable dierences from the benchmark
economy. Without housing adjustment costs, young households become homeowners much
earlier, but they are also much more likely to switch back to renting after experiencing a
negative house price shock (gure 10a). Old households never switch back to renting, even
after receiving exogenous moving shocks, since house liquidation upon death is now costless.
As seen in gure 10b and gure 10c, the life-cycle prole of housing consumption now follows
more closely that of non-housing consumption, and demonstrates a pronounced hump. In
addition, homeowners' non-housing consumption is much more responsive to changes in their
housing wealth compared to the benchmark case. The MPCs out of housing wealth are much
higher, and range from 18 percent for the very young to 6 percent for households in their 50s.
In terms of welfare, renters and young homeowners remain worse o by the house price
appreciation. The welfare losses, however, are smaller and homeowners on average break even
at a much younger age than the benchmark case, since earlier home ownership aords more
households an opportunity to at least partially hedge house price risks. These results are
intuitive. Without adjustment cost, households can freely reallocate expenditures between
two consumption goods. This 
exibility mitigates the adverse consequences of permanently
higher house prices, since households can easily \re-balance." To summarize, the eects of
housing adjustment costs on household consumption and welfare are quantitatively large and
important.
4.3. Comparison with the Eects of Liquid Asset Gains
To investigate the role of the dual purpose of housing as both a consumption good and an
investment asset, we examine the eects of wealth gains from a liquid asset as a proxy. The
only liquid asset in our model is a riskless bond with a constant rate of return. We, therefore,
study the eects of gains in liquid asset through temporary income shock since a household is
19indierent between a one-dollar gain from liquid asset and a one-dollar gain from transitory
income in our economy.23 The results are reported in gure 11.
Wealth gains from the liquid asset always lead to gains in both housing and non-housing
consumptions. The MPCs out of liquid wealth range from 12 percent for young homeowners
to around 6 percent for homeowners approaching retirement, much higher than the average
MPC out of housing wealth gains in our benchmark economy, yet closer to the average MPC
out of housing wealth gains without adjustment costs. The MPCs over the life cycle remain
U-shaped re
ecting the importance of liquidity and nite life horizon. The most interesting
result concerns the welfare consequences. The wealth gains in liquid assets now lead to welfare
improvements for all households. The reason is obvious. Unlike housing wealth gains, liquid
asset gains are not accompanied by an increase in housing consumption costs.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we developed a life-cycle model to study the eects of house price changes
on household consumption and welfare. Several key features distinguish the model from the
existing literature. First, we model housing choices along both the extensive margin of owning
versus renting and the intensive margin of house value. Second, we introduce a long-term xed-
rate mortgage contract with a collateral requirement for nancing house purchases. Third, we
explicitly distinguish between liquid savings and illiquid home equity by accounting for house
liquidation and mortgage renancing costs.
Our analysis indicates that although the aggregate consequences of a permanent house
price increase on a household's consumption and welfare are small, its eects at the individ-
ual household level vary signicantly, depending on a household's age and home ownership
status. Specically, the non-housing consumption of young and old homeowners are more
responsive to house price changes than that of middle-aged homeowners. More importantly,
while middle-aged and old homeowners benet from house price appreciation, renters and
young homeowners are worse o.
23Since retired households no longer face any income risk, we restrict our discussion to households below
age 65.
20Our analysis also points out that housing adjustment costs are important quantitatively in
explaining the large distributional eects. A complete elimination of the distributional eects,
however, requires innovative nancial products that separate the dual role of housing as both
a consumption good and an investment asset.
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24Appendix A: Model Simplications and Numerical Solutions
An analytical solution for our problem does not exist. We thus derive numerical solutions
through value function iterations. Given the recursive nature of the problem, we can rewrite
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where Xt = fDo
t 1;P Y
t ;P H




tg is the vector of choice variables.
We simplify the household's optimization problem by exploiting the scale-independence
of the problem and normalize the household's continuous state and choice variables by its
permanent income P Y
t or house value P H
t Ht. The vector of endogenous state variables is
transformed to xt = fDo
t 1;qt;ht;ltg, where qt =
Qt
PY
t is the household's wealth-permanent




t is the beginning-of-period house value to permanent income
ratio, and lt =
Mt 1(1+r)
PH
t Ht 1 is the beginning-of-period mortgage loan-to-value ratio. Let ct = Ct
PY
t




t be the house value-permanent income
ratio, st = St
PY
t be the liquid asset-permanent income ratio, and lt = Mt
PH
t Htbe the mortgage
loan-to-value ratio. The evolution of normalized endogenous state variables is then governed
by:
qt+1 =
st(1 + r) + Do
tht(1 + ~ rH




















The household's budget constraints (11) to (14) can then be written as
qt = ct + st + ht; (23)
qt = ct + st + (1   lt +   + )ht; (24)
qt = ct + st + (1   lt +     )ht; (25)






 to be the normalized value function, then the recursive optimiza-

































ct > 0; ht > 0; st  0; lt  1   ;
and equations (21) to (26), where at = fct;ht;lt;st;Do
t;Ds
t;Dr
tg is the normalized vector of
choice variables. Hence the normalization reduces the number of continuous state variables to
three with P Y
t no longer serving as a state variable and P H
t and Ht 1 combining into P H
t Ht 1.
We discretize the wealth{labor-income ratio (qt) into 320 grids equally-spaced in the loga-
rithm of the ratio, and the house value-labor income ratio (ht) and the mortgage loan-to-value
ratio (lt) into equally-spaced grids of 160. Due to the nonnegativity constraint for the holdings
of the liquid asset, the state space is not a cube for a homeowner since the liquidated home
equity value can not be larger than the value of the total wealth. I.e. only states that satisfy
ht(1 lt  )  qt are admissible. The boundaries for the grids are chosen to be wide enough
so that our simulated time series path always falls within the dened state space.
Under the assumption that only liquidated wealth will be passed along to beneciaries, the
household's house tenure status and housing and mortgage positions do not enter the bequest










The value function at date T is then used to solve for the optimal decision rules for all
admissible points on the state space at date T   1.
For a household coming into period t as a renter (Dt 1 = 0), we perform two separate
optimizations conditional on house tenure decision { renting or owning { for the current pe-
riod. A renter's optimal house tenure choice for the current period is then determined by
comparing the contingent value functions of renting and owning. If a renter keeps renting,
26he optimizes over only one choice variable ct, since ht = ct!
(1 !). If a renter initiates home
ownership in the current period, he needs to choose the optimal ct and ht simultaneously. To
calculate the expected next period's value function, we use two discrete states to approxi-
mate the realizations of each of the three continuous exogenous state variables (ln";ln, and
~ rH
t ) by Gaussian quadrature (Taughen and Hussey 1991). Together with two states for the
realizations of moving shocks, the procedure results in sixteen discrete exogenous states for
numerical integration. For points that lie between grid points in the state space, depend-
ing on the household's current period house tenure choice, we use either a one-dimension or
three-dimension cubic spline interpolation to approximate the value function.
For a household coming into period t as a homeowner, we perform two separate opti-
mizations conditional on its renancing decision for the current period. In both cases, the
household cannot adjust its house value-income ratio, i.e. ht = ht, but can adjust its nu-
meraire consumption. We take the higher value of the two optimized value functions as the
value function contingent on staying. The value function contingent on moving { either en-
dogenously or exogenously { is the same as the value function of a renter who is endowed
with the same wealth-income ratio (qt) because the entire mortgage balance is due upon home
sales and qt is dened as net of house selling costs. We compare the value functions contingent
on moving and staying to determine the optimal house liquidation decision. A homeowner
who cannot aord the minimum mortgage payment and house maintenance cost has to sell his
home. Under our assumption and parameterization, a homeowner always has positive amount
of equity in his house after home sales and thus has no incentive to default. This procedure
is repeated recursively for each period until the solution for date t = 0 is found.
27Appendix B: Empirical Analysis
This appendix describes data sources and explains the nonparametric regressions used to
construct our empirical regularities summarized in Figure 8.
Our data comes from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), collected by the Federal
Reserve Board. The SCF is a triennial survey of the balance sheet, pension, income, and other
demographic characteristics of US families. Our sample years include 1995, 1998, and 2001.
The term \household" used in the paper corresponds to the term \family" used in the SCF.24
The term \household age" used in the paper corresponds to the age of the family head in the
SCF.
Following Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002), we exploit the repeated nature of the
survey to build a pseudo panel. New households entering the survey are a large randomly-
chosen sample of the U.S. population and, consequently, they contain information about the
means (home ownership, mortgage loan-to-value ratio, etc.) of the groups they belong to.
This information can be exploited by interpreting the observed group means as a panel for
estimation purposes. This method is known as the pseudo panel or synthetic cohort technique.
We dene 55 cohorts according to the birth year of the household (1915 to 1970) and follow
them through the sample, generating a balanced panel. The average size of cells for all
households is 334, and the average size of cells for homeowners is 240.
To relate age and household housing decisions, we estimate the partial linear model
yit = constant + icohorti + t
t + m(ageit) + it; (27)
where cohorti is a dummy for each cohort except the youngest one, and 
t a dummy for each
survey year except 1995, m(ageit) = E(yitjageit) is a smooth nonparametric function of ageit.
To identify the separate eects of time, age, and cohort eects, we assume that time eects
are orthogonal to a time trend and that their sum is normalized to zero, i.e., we attribute
linear trends in the data to a combination of age and cohort eects (Deaton 1997).
24\Household" is reserved by the SCF to denote the set of the \family" (technically known as the \primary
economic unit") and any other individual that lives in the same household but it is economically independent.
28The partial linear model is estimated using the two-step estimator proposed by Speckman
(1988). The nonlinear part is estimated using the Gaussian Kernel with a bandwidth of 5. We
regress yit on m(ageit) to obtain residuals and then we project the residuals on the time and






Maximum life-cycle period T 60
Mandatory retirement period J 45
Preferences
Relative risk aversion 
 2
Bequest strength L 6
Discount rate  0.930
Housing preference ! 0.200
Labor Income and House Price Processes
Standard deviation of permanent income shock  0.103
Standard deviation of temporary income shock " 0.272
Income replacement ratio after retirement  0.682
Mean real housing return H 0.000
Standard deviation of housing return H 0.115
Liquid Savings
Risk-free interest rate r 0.030
Housing and Mortgage
Rental cost  0.060
Down payment requirement  0.200
House selling cost  0.060
Maintenance and depreciation cost   0.015
House purchasing cost  0.010
Mortgage renancing cost  0.005
30Table 2
The Baseline Model Economy
Statistics U.S. Data Model
Average Home Ownership Rate 0.67 0.72
Average Networth-Labor Income Ratio 3.10 3.20
Homeowner 4.29 3.82
Renter 0.76 0.26
Average House Value-Labor Income Ratio 2.77 3.39
Note: The average statistics for the U.S. data are calculated for a representative household over
its life cycle using the synthetic cohort technique outlined in Appendix B. Data source: Survey of
Consumer Finances, 1995-2001.
Table 3
The Eects of House Price Changes on Consumption and Welfare
Statistics Benchmark No adjustment cost
Changes in Home Ownership Rate (%) 0.44 0.53
Marginal Propensity to Consume (%) 4.06 6.94
Changes in Total Welfare (%) -0.98 0.16
Note: With the exception of Marginal Propensity to Consume, the statistics are calculated as per-
centage changes in home ownership rate and consumer welfare in the economy experiencing a positive
house price shock relative to the economy experiencing a negative house price shock.





















Renting vs. Owning Boundary
Figure 1. A Renter's House Tenure Decision as a Function of His Age and Net Worth-

































































Figure 3. A Renter's Optimal Liquid Saving Decision














































































































Figure 6. A Homeowner's Liquid Savings









a. Home Ownership Rate









b. Mean Mortgage Loan−to−Value Ratio



























d. Shares of Home Equity in Homeowners’ Total Wealth 
Figure 7. Optimal Life-cycle Housing and Consumption Decisions|Baseline Case


















a. Home Ownership Rate


















b. Mean Mortgage Loan−to−Value Ratio

































c. Mean Home Value for Homeowners









































d. Shares of Home Equity in Homeowners’ Total Wealth 
Figure 8. Empirical Life-Cycle Housing and Mortgage Choices Based on SCF Data from
1995 to 2001










































































































d. Wealth Gains from Housing Appreciation










e. MPC out of Housing Wealth




































Figure 9. The Consumption and Welfare Eects of House Price Shocks under Baseline
Parameterizations










































































































d. Wealth Gains from Housing Appreciation














e. MPC out of Housing Wealth
































Figure 10. The Consumption and Welfare Eects of House Price Shocks with Zero Adjust-
ment Costs
















































































d. Wealth Gain from Transitory Labor Income










e. MPC out of Transitory Income Shocks

































f. Utility Costs from Transitory Income Shocks
All
Homeowners
Figure 11. The Consumption and Welfare Eects of Transitory Income Shocks under Base-
line Parameterizations
38